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‘The subject’ and Voice: Cross-Chapter Discussion 
 
Rachel Cockburn and Konstantinos Thomaidis 
 
 
Konstantinos Thomaidis: Thank you for sharing your chapter and its engaging discussion of 
a difficult ‘&’ – that of performance studies and political philosophy. There are a couple of 
points in particular that prompted further thinking for me. Let me start with the notion of the 
subject, for example. The second definition of the subject you provide refers to experts 
engaging in a disciplinary act (analysing or effecting performance, for example). I wonder 
what other categories could be productive in discussing their practices. Focusing on the 
person, the doer, for a moment, a couple of other terms, with different genealogies and 
resonances, come to mind: the individual and the self. Juxtapositions with ‘the subject’ might 
be of use in interdisciplinary exchange, specifically because they reveal the histories, 
assumptions and values each term connotes, in other words, specifically because they shift 
the emphasis from knowledge-as-object to knowledge-as-practice. When a ‘performer’ is 
(seen, understood, discussed, trained as) an individual, I sense an underlying opposition at 
play; the performer is an individual rather than part of a collective or ensemble, or is 
idiosyncratic, distinctive within the marketplace of performance. The performer as self comes 
with the tools and concepts of psychoanalysis; what shapes the self as an artist? What hinders 
the expression of ‘the true self’? How does the performer find their self? On the other hand, 
the performer as subject, to my eyes, partakes in the nexus of ideology; the term or 
appellation refers to what the performer believes is performance, how it should be practised, 
for what reasons and for whom (in accordance with a set of generally accepted values).  
As my inclination is always to return to voice(s), I tend to think of Althusser when referring 
to the ideological making of the subject in his famous ‘hailing’ scene, when an individual is 
addressed by a policeman and responds to the call. It is in that moment that the individual 
becomes a subject, by accepting the call, recognising themselves in the call, and by 
simultaneously establishing and perpetuating the power relations that go with participating in 
such a call-and- response. Extending this scheme, if we are to speak of the subject of 
performance studies, who does the calling? And who responds? For what reason? Who 
decides when an individual/scholar – or why not, a self (someone for whom conducting 
research ‘rings true’/‘close to home’ or is a practice fundamentally definitional for who they 
are) – becomes a subject/scholar?  
 
Rachel Cockburn: A generous response, with many interesting thoughts. Though first, 
which might not be as clear as I had intended in the chapter, but the main disciplines I 
initially aimed to address were performance and political philosophy, performance in the 
context of performance studies – and the tricky concept of the ‘subject.’ Performance studies 
was something thrown my way further down the path, and I am still grappling with 
negotiating that and political philosophy. I say this just as a way of giving a sense of the 
direction I am coming from. And in turn, how it informs my response.  
There are many slippery and tricky terms in this terrain, and certainly I think considering the 
three – the individual, the self, and the subject – is both extremely interesting and quite the 
can of worms. The sense of opposition at play you point to in terms of the individual/self and 
the subject, while I see it can be understood as an opposition, for my part I do not see them in 
actuality as oppositions. Though they are oppositions in terms of how they are understood 
perhaps.  
In terms of political philosophy at least, whilst Althusser’s notion of interpellation is very apt, 
I see the constitution of ‘the subject’ as something more immanent to the individual 
themselves. For example, following a biopolitical way of thinking – though I am cautious not 
to go down that rabbit-hole here – the networks, technologies and regimes of self are not 
external to the individual but shape the very way we understand ourselves as individuals, the 
very way we might come to identify our ‘true self,’ and we can only do this if we are 
subjects. Arguably, is the notion of a ‘true self’ not also an ideological construction?  
 
KT: This is precisely the point that I am getting at. I am not trying to establish a(n 
essentialist, ahistorical and presupposed) distinction between terms or positionalities. I am 
more interested in the circumstances and contexts of their use and application – which means, 
in when and for what reasons someone chooses to examine (or address) the performer as a 
subject, as a self, or as an individual. Returning to voice-related practices for a brief moment, 
a performer can simultaneously be a self (to be deconstructed and restructured according to 
the way a specific training understands the ‘true self’), an individual (that builds on the above 
scenario of selfhood in a personal way so as to be marketed as unique), and a subject 
(enacting a tacit politics of participation and/or exclusion from professional communities). 
The question for me would be: why does the trainee voicer need to be addressed as (such) a 
self in the first place? Are there ways to resist this delineation or foreground the ideological 
workings of such modes of address and such practices within voice pedagogy?  
 
RC: Not knowing much at all about voice studies/practice in performance or forensics, I am 
responding to this from the outside a little. The thing that came to mind reading your chapter, 
time and again was the classical political distinction first set out by Aristotle – that between 
voice and speech – phone and logos. I am brutally paraphrasing here, and perhaps you know 
it better than me, but basically logos is political speech, logos being that which distinguishes 
the qualified life of bios politikos, whereas phone is voice – babble, incoherent utterances, 
belonging to the animal. Of course, that distinction set out so bluntly by Aristotle has been 
softened down the centuries, but certainly there is the distinction still present in the world we 
live in today... And I was very interested in this sense of how you are looking at the voice – 
not speech – and taking it in its material, affective, utterance form so to speak, rather than 
speech. But at the same time, the voice is qualified through a scientific frame, or ‘expert’ that 
renders it intelligible and validated, to be spoken about.  
I was particularly interested in terms of the distinction you make in the end between voice - 
stable and predetermined, and voicing as unruly and processual. Does speech not come into 
this as the predetermined? Or where does speech come into this at all? Why not? Is this 
interesting to consider at all in terms of the political aspect of the work, and more specifically 
in relation to the ‘subject’? Perhaps this distinction between voice and speech is moot, but I 
was just interested thinking this through in terms of some political theory distinctions.  
 
KT: There is much debate around the terms and their respective genealogies. Currently, I 
tend to deploy ‘voice’ as a more open term that can encompass speech but, crucially, other 
material manifestations of phonation (non-verbal sounds, for instance), voices understood as 
internal (voice of conscience and verbal hallucinations), and voice as a metaphor (the voice 
of the oppressed). This use helps me go beyond a politics of speech (exchange of formulated 
ideas) towards a politics of voice, which can refer to linguistic political discourse but also an 
embodied politics of vocality.  
Taking cue from your text and response here, but thinking mostly of my practice as a voice 
practitioner-scholar, let me divert further towards voice. This is a highly personal(ised) take, 
but going through the philosophical and critical literature of/on voice, it appears that there are 
two, fundamentally apposite, approaches to voice and subjectivity-making. One strand 
conflates voice with subject; voice announces the self and claims its (personal, social or 
political) ‘place’ in a unique, unmistakable way. Whenever someone voices, the unheard 
underlying ‘sub-text’ is ‘This is me saying: ...’ Think of seeing a friend on the street. They 
turn to you saying ‘Good morning’; according to this strand of thought, your friend delineates 
themselves as separate, unique, unrepeatable in addressing you: ‘(This is me, your friend, and 
I say to you) “Good morning.”’ This understanding of voice has been taken up by sociology 
and political analysis, assigning ‘voices’ to groups, or helping marginalised and 
disenfranchised groups ‘find their voice’. The other strand, drawing on psychoanalytical 
theory, presents a more complex scenario: the embryo hears the mother’s voice as a 
surrounding, resonating presence inside her body, the voice literally bathes the embryo into a 
‘one-ness’ with the mother and it recognises her voice as its own – or as an extension of the 
connection that is the dyad it forms with the mother. When the newborn starts developing a 
sense of the self as separate from the mother, the voice also emerges as a separation: the baby 
starts experiencing the voice as something the mother responds to with her own voice. The 
realisation comes that they both have a separate voice; the personal voice is an outcome of a 
separation, of the breaking down of the assumption of oneness. According to this line of 
thinking, each voicing act is underlined not by an announcement of identity but by a yearning 
for that lost oneness, for a voice that will resound back. In the above example, the sub-text in 
your friend’s address would be: ‘(I am addressing you and I yearn for a response to my voice 
when saying) “Good morning.”’ In the first case, voice is an excess of selfhood, in the second 
a fundamental lack. Practically, I am not convinced that any uber-scenario stands its ground 
as an overarching, all-applicable formula, but the distinction helps me ask: is your critique 
addressed to ‘the subject’/knower as excessive, delineated, concrete, announcing him/herself? 
Are there ways to generate ‘the subject’ as lacking and vulnerable, as always intersubjective?  
 
RC: The political philosopher Ernesto Laclau has a very interesting distinction of ‘the 
subject’ and ‘subject positions,’ which is informed quite a lot from Lacan’s work around the 
subject and, of course, lack. He makes the distinction between the subject which is the 
unrepresentable ‘empty place’ – I think he means here the ‘I,’ and ‘subject positions.’ There 
is a lack of full identity in the subject and it is for this very reason that the subject necessarily 
has to invest in socially determined subject positions – ‘artist,’ ‘academic,’ ‘student’ etc. – 
and the values, beliefs, modes of knowledge within which these are articulated. This process 
of identification involves a struggle, so to speak, of the various subject positions. And, 
thinking about what you say above, perhaps it could be possible to think of this struggle in 
terms of the identifications of the subject/self/individual, and the voice/speech. If when the 
subject identifies with a specific subject position, the subject is reduced to a specific subject 
position, then this struggle is exciting to think about in terms of practice – whether it be the 
practice of the scholar or the voice practitioner, or both.  
What I am asking here is can the performance studies scholar resist reduction into a subject 
position and what practice might that generate, or not? Certainly, this is interesting to 
consider in terms of the distinction of voice and speech. How do we understand the voice 
within performance studies scholarship beyond that of simply the authorial voice? The 
question for performers – how does a performer resist being a performer ‘subject position’, 
and work from the place of the subject – particularly in terms of a disciplinary practice? And 
not necessarily as the ‘true self’ or some via negativa. Of course addressing these questions is 
not necessary in the making of performance practice, though it is an important consideration 
if we want to ask how the ‘political’ subject of performance might be understood. I think this 
is getting at your point at the end of this last section.  
